which might eventually be controlled by the B VerfG in cases of doubt. It at no point fully embraced a theory of supremacy of Community law over German constitutional law, as had been developed by the European Court. 4 Therefore, the Maastricht judgment of 12 October 1993 5 insisted that the German Constitutional Court still had jurisdiction to challenge Community acts on the basis that they extended Union competence or violated the essence of fundamental rights. The BVerfG wrote:
The ... Court by its jurisdiction guarantees that an effective protection of basic rights for the inhabitants of Germany will also generally be maintained as against the sovereign powers of the Communities and will be accorded the same respect as the protection of basic rights required unconditionally by the Constitution, and in particular the Court provides a general safeguard of the essential content of the basic rights. The Court thus guarantees this essential content as against the sovereign powers of the Community as well... However, the Court exercises its jurisdiction on the applicability of secondary Community legislation in Germany in a 'relationship of co-operation' with the European Court, under which that Court guarantees protection of basic rights in any particular case for the whole area of the European Communities, and the Constitutional Court can therefore restrict itself to a general guarantee of the constitutional standards that cannot be dispensed with (at 79).6
It also allowed review [of] legal instruments of European institutions and agencies to see whether they remain within the limits of the sovereign rights conferred on them or transgress them [...oder aus ihnen ausbrechen] (at 89).
7
Apart from making various other qualifications in the Maastricht judgment, which were both severely criticized 8 and also cautiously applauded 9 in legal scholarship, the BVerfG made clear that it would serve as a 'long stop' to control Community law under principles of German constitutional law. It explicitly, and not only implicitly as in the Solange II decision, rejected the theory of precedence and supplemented it by its theory of 'co-operation'. The conflict arena which it set out in theory came into existence in the banana litigation. The regulation, on the one hand, sets up a system of assistance to ACP-banana producers, and on the other hand establishes quotas and tariffs for third country bananas with a view to restricting their import or making them more costly to consumers. Preferential quotas were allocated to importers according to prior sales during a period of three years before the entering into force of the regulation, under Article 19(2). A special mechanism was provided to adapt quotas to 'exceptional circumstances' and to overcome difficulties 'of a sensitive There is no doubt that the regulation hit German importers particularly hard. They were de facto banned or severely restricted from importing third country bananas at the preferential tariffs which had made them particularly popular with German consumers. Prior to this point there had been little or no restrictions on such imports.
2. Both the German importers and the German Government on their behalf lodged complaints against the EC banana regulation with a view to obtaining interim relief under Article 185/186, and to declaring void the regulation according to Article 173 of the EC Treaty. The European Court regarded the complaints of the importers as inadmissible. In its view, the importers lacked standing to sue because they were not directly and individually concerned by the regulation 11 -a regrettably narrow interpretation of the locus standi requirement under EC law.
12 It would only allow recourse under Article 215(2) of the EC Treaty to recover damages in case of illegality of Community action.
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Insofar as the German Government acted as parens patriae for the German importers, the complaint was admissible, but interim relief was not granted by order of 29 June 1993. 14 In its carefully worded judgment of 5 October 1994, 15 the Court finally dismissed the German complaint, especially insofar as it charged the EC regulation with having infringed upon fundamental rights granted by EC law, or upon provisions of GATT insofar as they were binding upon the Community. It referred to earlier case-law which had decided that Community law must not violate fundamental rights, and that the ECJ has jurisdiction to review the constitutionality of Community acts with regard to defending EC citizens' rights of nondiscrimination, property and freedom to pursue a trade or business. 16 However it could not find such a violation because objectives of 'general interest' were pursued by the regulation, and the act did not constitute 'a disproportionate and intolerable interference, impairing the very substance of the rights guaranteed' (No. 78). Importers could not claim ,a right 'to property in a market share ' (No. 79 ). An eventual infringement of GATT provisions would not void acts of the Community because these were not sufficiently precise (No. 109). 17 The Court did not look at the absence of transitory arrangements to help German importers adapt to changing market situations, but the German Government had not really raised this point.
IV.
1. If the litigation had ended with the Court judgment of 5 October 1994, this would have been regarded by doctrine as a recognition of fundamental rights theory in EC law and perhaps would only have provoked a debate on whether the European Court takes rights theory seriously or uses it just for the sake of rhetoric. 18 The German importers, however, continued their litigation by turning to the German courts. They were surprisingly successful here, despite the clear wording of the banana judgment of the European Court. Their main argument was, on the one hand, that European law violated their right to protection of private property because it did not provide for a transitory regime to make adaptation possible without risk of bankruptcy to the new market organization for bananas, especially for those importers who had done little business with third countries in the three years prior to the regulation coming into force. On the other hand, they insisted on the priority of GATT obligations over Community regulations under Article 234 and charged the EC institutions, including the ECJ, with 'transgressing' jurisdiction in not considering the Judge-made 'Europe a la carte'
The Hessian court was certainly in a dilemma because it was caught between the principle of precedence voiced by the European Court in its Foto-Frost and Zuckerfabrik Suderdithmarschen judgments, and the insistence of the German Constitutional Court on fundamental rights protection under the GG made possible by having found lacunae in Regulation 404/93 which could be used to protect the right to property of the importer.
V.
1. Unfortunately this somewhat complex story is not yet finished. The importer who had had partial success in' administrative proceedings used still another legal pathway to make imports at preferential tariffs possible. First they called again upon the Constitutional Court to grant them a preferential quota. The Court rejected this claim by insisting that the importer ask first relief from German (and not European) courts.
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2. This time the Financial Court of Hamburg (FinG Hamburg, a special but separate branch of administrative courts competent in proceedings on taxes, tariffs and the like) was seized with taking action. The importer had shipped bananas to Germany without having a licence to import at preferential tariffs and refused to pay the regular tariffs. They demanded these licences from the competent administrative authority which could only refuse them. However, the FinG Hamburg overturned this refusal. In its order of 19 May 1995 26 it uses the second line of argument mentioned above, which had already been brought forward but rejected in former proceedings before the European Court, and refers the case back to it again. It voices serious doubts about the conformity of Regulation 404/93 with GATT. Since the German Government is bound by GATT and the Community must respect this obligation according to Article 234 EC Treaty, the FinG wants to know from the European Court whether the prohibitions on imports of third country bananas can really have effect in Germany, or whether GATT provisions enjoy priority over secondary Community law, notwithstanding their direct effect in favour of importers. The FinG supports its own theory by referring to two (!) authors of legal doctrine. It knows very well that its order is an overt challenge to ECJ case-law where the question posed by the FinG had already been answered in the negative.
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At the end of its order, the FinG reserves to itself the right to ask for constitutional review before the BVerfG against an eventual judgment of the European Court as expected under the reference proceedings. The FinG refers to the adding the important qualification that national courts must pay due respect to judgments of the ECJ and CFI. 
VI.
'Ausbrechende Rechtsakte' -a new phrase in constitutional and legal theory, created by the BVerfG and practically applied by the FinG which can hardly be translated into English without eliminating the note of defiance which it strikes. This challenge to jurisdiction is not, as in the past, directed against Member States who do not fulfill their obligations under Article 5 of the EC Treaty, but against measures of the Community; it is not voiced by a European but by a national court.
Rarely in the history of Community law after the Single Act has a higher court of law defied so overtly the precedence and uniformity of Community law as well as the exclusive competence of the European Court to review it. The confidence which the European Court, in its Zuckerfabrik Siiderdithmarschen judgment, displayed in national courts, whereby the latter may suspend the application of Community law in limited circumstances despite its supremacy, will be frustrated in cases of open refusal by national courts to follow earlier precedents of the European Court, and of abuse of the Article 177 procedure to ask preliminary questions which have already been answered.
The order of the FinG Hamburg is a direct consequence of the Maastricht judgment of the BVerfG which created the term 'ausbrechende Rechtsakte'. The Hamburg judgment, if other jurisdictions follow suit, could encourage Member States to proclaim supremacy of their specific theories on fundamental rights and on the relationship between international and European law over Community action. The idea of fundamental rights' protection risks being transformed into a tool for the protection of the property rights of special groups, whose interests take priority over the 'objectives of general interest pursued by the Community', as the Court has so clearly said in its banana judgment. The control of Community jurisdiction by the ECJ under its general mandate of Article 164, namely to guarantee the observance of 'the law', would be seriously impaired if national courts could install a parallel jurisdiction controlling the legality of Community acts under fundamental rights 28 Author's addendum.
Judge-made 'Europe a la carte' theory or international law according to Article 234. 29 The banana litigation may, if the Hamburg order finds recognition, than indeed lead to a Europe of 'banana republics a la carte', each viciously defending their own fundamental rights theory and competences, and rejecting the idea of 'an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe...', as proclaimed in Article A of the Union Treaty.
To paraphrase Goethe in his well-known poem Der Zauberlehrling: 'Die ich rief, die Geister, werd' ich nun nicht los!' It remains to be seen whether the BVerfG, which still has to hear another constitutional complaint lodged against the banana regulation, can put the genie it created back into the bottle where it belongs. It may be that the ECJ has already done so by insisting, in its Atlanta I judgment, that national courts may suspend Community acts and grant'interim relief only when 'respecting' the judgments of the ECJ or the CFI on the legality of Community acts.
VII. (addendum)
After having written these lines, the author received the full text of the order of the Bundesfmanzhof of 9 January 1996 (1996 Europaisches Wirtschafts-und Steuerrecht (EWS) , 49). The order concerned an appeal brought by the Hamburg customs authorities against the Finanzgericht Hamburg. The latter had allowed interim relief against a decision of the customs authorities which demanded securities (Sicherheitsleistung) from German third country banana importers if they wanted to receive a waiver to pay customs duties. The Bundesfmanzhof rejected the appeal because there were serious doubts as to the legality of the banana regulation upon which the decision of customs authorities was based. It insisted on the priority of German international law obligations under GATT according to Article 234 of the EC Treaty which could not be set aside by EC regulations. This question, in the opinion of the Bundesfinanzhof, had not yet been decided by the European Court. Even if it were to be decided against the German theory of priority of international law obligations over EC law, this could be regarded as an ausbrechender Rechtsakt according to the Maastricht judgment of the Bundesverfassungsgericht of 12 October 1993. Article 234 allows Member States the defence (Einrede) that EC institutions had violated international law obligations and that these acts were therefore not binding, a question which had eventually to be determined by Member State courts of law, not by the European Court. If the opinion of the Bundesfinanzhof were followed, Article 234 would be a way out of Member State obligations under Article 5. This conflict, in my opinion, eventually has to be decided by the European, not the German courts. 
